

Message Text

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TAGS:OVIP (KISSINGER)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT MICHAEL GETLER AND THOMAS O'TOOLE
BYLINER, WASHPOST 7/4/74, HEADLINED: SUMMIT GETS MIXED SCORE
2. DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES R. SCHLESINGER SAID YESTERDAY HE
FULLY SUPPORTS THE NEW ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS REACHED AT
THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, AND HE REJECTED SUGGESTIONS THAT THE
PENTAGON OR U.S. MILITARY COMMANDERS MAY HAVE STOOD IN THE
WAY OF REACHING MUCH MORE SIGNIFICANT ACCORDS.
3. AT A PENTAGON NEWS CONFERENCE, SCHLESINGER WAS ASKED
ABOUT POST-SUMMIT REMARKS IN MOSCOW BY SECRETARY OF STATE
HENRY A. KISSINGER SUGGESTING THAT "BOTH SIDES HAVE TO
CONVINCE THEIR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE BENEFITS OF
RESTRAINT, AND THAT DOES NOT COME EASILY TO EITHER SIDE."
4. KISSINGER, IN TURN, HAD SPOKEN AFTER SOVIET COMMUNIST
PARTY CHIEF LEONID I. BREZHNEV, ON TUESDAY NIGHT, SAID HE
THOUGHT THE NEW NUCLEAR ARMS AGREEMENT MIGHT HAVE BEEN
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BROADER.

5. SCHLESINGER STRESSED THAT NEITHER THE DEFENSE DEPART-
MENT NOR THE UNIFORMED MILITARY HAD IMPEDED ADDITIONAL

AGREEMENTS. " WE HAVE FIRM CIVILIAN CONTROL IN THIS

COUNTRY," HE SAID, ADDING THAT NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY THE SOVIETS THAT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO KISSINGER BUT WHICH HAD BEEN VETOED BY SCHLESINGER OR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

6. ASKED IF HE FELT KISSINGER WAS REALLY TALKING ABOUT THE POWER OF THE SOVIET MILITARY TO THWART CONCESSIONS AND JUST ADDED "BOTH SIDES" AS A DIPLOMATIC NICETY, SCHLESINGER SAID HE COULDN'T ELABORATE FURTHER, BUT "THERE'S NO PROBLEM HERE."

7. SCHLESINGER WAS JOINED AT THE PENTAGON NEWS CONFERENCE BY DR. FRED IKLE, DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY. BOTH OFFICIALS SAID THEY FELT THE AGREEMENTS THAT WERE REACHED, TO LIMIT UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS TO A 150-KILOTON LEVEL AND TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) SITES TO ONE FOR EACH COUNTRY WERE SIGNIFICANT STEPS.

8. THOUGH NO FIRM AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO LIMIT DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE-TARGETED INDEPENDENT RE-ENTRY VEHICLES (MIRV) MISSILES, SCHLESINGER WARNED AGAINST BECOMING IMPATIENT WITH THE PACE OF ARMS CONTROL.

9. "IT IS A FRAGILE DEVELOPMENT THAT MUST BE TREATED WITH GREAT CARE, AND ANYTHING THAT CAN SUSTAIN THE DIALOGUE IS A DESIRABLE DEVELOPMENT," HE SAID REFERRING TO THE AGREEMENTS THAT WERE SIGNED AND THE PROSPECT OF RENEWED MIRV NEGOTIATIONS, NEXT MONTH, HE SAID "THERE ARE CONCRETE STEPS, USEFUL IN AND OF THEMSELVES, AND THEY SHOULD BE ENDORSED BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE."

10. IN AN EFFORT TO DISPEL REPORTS OF A WIDENING SPLIT WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION OVER HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE WATERGATE ENVIRONMENT, SCHLESINGER SAID UNCLASSIFIED

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THE ADMINISTRATION MANAGED TO PUT TOGETHER "AN AGREEMENT WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE GENERAL APPROACH TO BE TAKEN IN MOSCOW" BEFORE THE PRESIDENT DEPARTED.

11. THE PARTIAL UNDERGROUND TEST BAN TREATY DOES NOT GO INTO EFFECT FOR 21 MONTHS, AND SCHLESINGER CONCEDED THAT THIS WOULD NO DOUBT PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO COMPLETE PROOF-TESTING THEIR NEW 1-TO-2 MEGATON WARHEADS FOR THEIR NEW MIRV'S. A MEGATON IS EQUIVALENT TO 1 MILLION TONS OF TNT.

12. HE ALSO SAID IT WOULD ALLOW THE UNITED STATES TO COMPLETE SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AS A NEW WARHEAD FOR THE

TRIDENT AND MINUTEMAN MISSILES AND FOR NEW BOMBER-CARRIED WEAPONS.

13. BUT BOTH OFFICIALS MAINTAINED THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD EVENTUALLY CONSTRAIN BOTH SIDES FROM DEVELOPING STILL NEWER LARGE WEAPONS AND WOULD EVENTUALLY PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM FURTHER "OPTIMIZING" THEIR LARGE MISSILE PAYLOAD ADVANTAGE BY PUTTING MANY MORE SMALL WARHEADS ON THEM.

14. THE NEW 150-KILOTON LIMIT ON UNDERGROUND TESTS IS SEEN MORE AS A POLITICAL MOVE THAN A MILITARY ONE. FEW WEAPONS BEING TESTED TODAY BY EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION RUN HIGHER THAN 150 KILOTONS, WHICH IS THE EQUIVALENT OF 150,000 TONS OF TNT.

15. IN 1972 AND 1973, THE UNITED STATES CONDUCTED 14 UNDERGROUND ATOMIC TESTS IN THE NEVADA DESERT. ONLY ONE WAS MORE THAN 150 KILOTONS, SEVEN TESTS WERE LESS THAN 20 KILOTONS, SUGGESTING THAT MOST OF THE EMPHASIS IN THE U.S. PROGRAM WAS ON MINIATURIZING ITS WEAPONS RATHER THAN BUILDING THEM UP.

16. THE SOVIETS HAD 27 UNDERGROUND TESTS IN THE SAME PERIOD, SIX OF THEM GREATER IN FORCE THAN 150 KILOTONS. ONE SOVIET TEST IN 1972 WAS IN THE MEGATON RANGE. ANOTHER LAST YEAR WAS IN THE 3-TO 6 MEGATON RANGE, MEANING ALMOST SURELY THAT IT WAS A TEST OF THE SOVIET UNCLASSIFIED

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ABM WARHEAD.

17. ALMOST ALL THE U.S. UNDERGROUND TESTS IN THE MEGATON RANGE THE LAST SIX YEARS WERE RELATED TO THE ABM WARHEAD. THE LARGEST WAS THE 5-MEGATON CANNIKIN TEST IN 1971 UNDER THE ALASKAN ISLAND OF AMCHITKA, WHICH WAS A COMBINED "PROOF AND EFFECTS" TEST OF THE ABM WARHEAD.

18. WEAPONS EXPERTS INSIST THERE IS NOTHING MAGIC ABOUT THE 150-KILOTON LIMIT. ONE SOURCE SAID IT WAS SIMPLY THE "NEGOTIATED" NUMBER, MEANING IT WAS THE FORCE THAT BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION FELT THEY CAN LIVE WITH WHEN THE TREATY GOES INTO EFFECT.

19. AT THE SAME TIME, THE THRESHOLD OF 150 KILOTONS ALLOWS BOTH NATIONS TO TEST THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS A LOT LARGER THAN 150 KILOTONS AGAINST A VARIETY OF IMAGINED DEFENSES. THE REASON IS THAT AN EXPLOSION OF 150 KILOTONS

GIVES EFFECTS THAT, AS ONE SOURCE PUT IT, CAN BE "EXTRAPOLATED OUT A LOT HIGHER THAN 150 KILOTONS."

20. ANOTHER REASON FOR THE AGREED-ON LIMIT OF 150 KILOTONS IS THAT ITS SIZE ALLOWS FOR NUMEROUS TEST EFFECTS TO BE BUILT INTO EACH TEST. SMALLER TESTS LIMIT THE NUMBER OF EXPERIMENTS WEAPONS MAKERS CAN PERFORM.

21. THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO POLITICAL REASONS FOR THE AGREEMENT TO LIMIT TESTS TO 150 KILOTONS. ONE IS TO SHOW THE REST OF THE WORLD THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ARE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF A FULL TEST BAN, MOVEMENT THAT MIGHT ENCOURAGE OTHER NATIONS TO SIGN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY FORBIDDING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

22. THE OTHER REASON MORE CLOSELY INVOLVES THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THIS IS TO ALLOW BOTH COUNTRIES TO GATHER SEISMIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE OTHER'S TESTS, SO THAT EACH COUNTRY WILL FEEL SECURE THAT THE OTHER IS NOT CHEATING ON THE 150-KILOTON LIMIT.

23. THE AGREEMENT EVEN CALLS FOR CALIBRATION SHOTS,
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WHICH MEANS EACH COUNTRY WILL TELL THE OTHER AHEAD OF TIME WHAT KIND OF TEST IT IS CONDUCTING, PRECISELY WHERE IT IS CONDUCTING IT, HOW DEEP IN THE GROUND AND IN WHAT KIND OF SOIL OR ROCK.

24. SCHLESINGER MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS THE "GROSS" AND "DISPROPORTIONATE" INCREASES NOW PLANNED IN THE SOVIET MISSILE PROGRAM THAT WERE THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO ACHIEVING MORE COMPREHENSIVE MISSILE AGREEMENTS THAT MAINTAINED "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALANCE" IN NUCLEAR STRIKE POWER.

25. SCHLESINGER SAID THE PENTAGON HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF RESTRAINT.

26. "THE FURTHER EXPANSION OF STRATEGIC CAPABILITY ON BOTH SIDES SERVES NO PURPOSE...IT IS NOT NECESSARY, IN FACT, THOSE LEVELS ALREADY REACHED ARE PERHAPS UNNECESSARILY HIGH," HE SAID.

27. STILL, SCHLESINGER REFERRED ONCE AGAIN TO THE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF "PERCEPTION" OF EACH NATION'S NUCLEAR FORCES EVEN IF DIFFERENCES DON'T MEAN MUCH MILITARILY. THUS, HE STRESSED, THE UNITED STATES "COULD NOT LIVE WITH" A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO COMPLETELY MIRV ALL OF THEIR REPLACEMENT MISSILE FORCES OVER THE NEXT SIX TO EIGHT YEARS.

28. UNDER QUESTIONING, SCHLESINGER ALSO REJECTED THE IDEA THAT THE MILITARY MAY HAVE BEEN USED AS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON MIRV DUE TO OTHER REASONS.

29. HE SAID THAT NOT ONLY HAD BOTH SIDES FAILED TO AGREE ON THE DETAILS OF HOW A MIRV LIMITATION WOULD WORK, BUT THAT THERE WAS STILL NO ADEQUATE CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE OVERALL STRATEGIC ISSUES FOR BOTH SIDES TO MOVE AHEAD WITH NEW AGREEMENTS.

30. IT HAS BEEN KNOWN FOR SOME TIME THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ALLOW SOME ADVANTAGES TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE NUMBERS OF MIRV MISSILES, BUT SINCE THE SOVIET MISSILES ARE SO MUCH LARGER THAN THE U.S. COUNTERPARTS, THE DIFFERENCE UNCLASSIFIED

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WOULD HAVE TO BE SIGNIFICANT AND THUS FAR, OFFICIALS SAY, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT MAKE SUCH CONCESSIONS.

31. SCHLESINGER SAID HE REGRETTED THIS SITUATION AND HOPED THAT IN THE FUTURE THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF BOTH SIDES COULD BE LIMITED.

32. THOUGH SCHLESINGER HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN PICTURED AS A HAWK ON THE QUESTION OF ARMS CONTROL MEASURES, HE HAS GENERALLY LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE DOES NOT OPPOSE ANY POTENTIAL MIRV AGREEMENT AT THIS TIME AS LONG AS IT INCLUDES SOME SOVIET CONCESSIONS.

33. SCHLESINGER AND OTHER CIVILIAN OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ACTING VERY TOUGH IN THE ARMS TALKS AND SEEMED TO FEEL THAT EVENTS WERE GOING THEIR WAY AND THUS DID NOT HAVE TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS AT THIS TIME.

34. THE INTENT, FROM THE START, HAS BEEN TO GET THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF NEW MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRV THAT ARE USED AS REPLACEMENTS FOR THEIR EXISTING 1,500-MISSILE LAND-BASED ICBM FORCE. SISCO

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